Open networking architecture

Expose connectivity.
Not the network.

A deliberately minimal forwarding fabric for WireGuard endpoints operating behind CGNAT, mobile networks and restrictive NAT environments.

The central idea: the only publicly exposed relay is deliberately outside the protected network.

The trust boundary
InternetPublic / untrusted
BastionRoute RelayForwarding only · outside the LAN · payload blind
WireGuardEncryption · authentication · cryptographic trust
Private NetworkActual hosts and services
01 — Architecture

A relay that doesn't belong to the network.

BastionRoute moves the reachability problem outside the security boundary. The endpoint establishes an outbound WebSocket connection; the relay forwards opaque traffic; WireGuard remains the endpoint-to-endpoint security layer.

“The relay controls the road — not the destination network.”

It has no need for a private-network interface, a route into the LAN, or WireGuard private keys. Its essential job is to associate connections and move bytes.

Software switching fabric

The relay is closer to a switch than a VPN gateway. It does not need to understand IP packets, WireGuard semantics, or application protocols.

Outbound onlyPayload agnosticWebSocketWireGuard
02 — Security model

Separate reachability from trust.

The exposed component is intentionally given less authority and less knowledge. WireGuard retains the cryptographic trust boundary at the endpoints.

The relay can see

Connections, timing, traffic volume, frame sizes and connection state.

The relay does not inherently see

WireGuard plaintext, private keys, internal hosts, internal topology or application semantics.

The relay can still attack availability

A hostile relay can drop, delay or disrupt traffic and can observe transport metadata. Payload blindness is not anonymity.

0private-network routes required by relay
0WireGuard private keys held by relay
1simple forwarding responsibility
1cryptographic trust boundary
03 — Built for difficult networks

CGNAT becomes a transport problem.

The endpoint does not need a stable public address or inbound reachability. It needs outbound connectivity — a much more practical assumption on modern mobile and NAT-constrained networks.

AndroidProtected endpoint
5G / Wi-FiChanging access network
OutboundWebSocket transport
RelayOpaque forwarding
WireGuardPrivate connectivity

Real-world validation

The architecture has been built and operated on Android behind 5G/CGNAT and across Wi-Fi and cellular transitions, with the variable latency and network-path changes that come with mobile connectivity.

04 — The project

Small mechanism. Large practical consequence.

BastionRoute is an exploration of how little the Internet-facing component needs to know to make an encrypted private network reachable from difficult environments.

Capabilities

Outbound WebSocket transport, UDP adaptation, relay forwarding, CGNAT traversal, mobile-network resilience and deployment behind conventional TLS infrastructure.

Architectural character

The interesting property is not custom cryptography. It is the deliberate placement of the exposed relay outside the private network and the separation of forwarding from cryptographic trust.

GoWireGuardWebSocketsAndroidCGNATTLSNetwork securityAI-assisted engineering
The principle

Make the exposed component as ignorant as possible.